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When we economists analyze development policy, what do we do? First of all, we 
have to have a description of the economy—of individuals, households, firms, farms and 
any other relevant entities, how they behave and how they interact. Typically, we model 
this interaction as being through markets, mostly competitive, although every now and then 
(for example for oligopolistic product markets) we do model non-competitive interactions, 
and (for example for interactions within the household) we do model non-market 
interactions. Having set up the “non-policy” outcome (that is to say, non the policy we are 
interested in) we then introduce the policy and work out the consequences given our model 
of the economy specified earlier. For those of us in the new political economy school, we 
might also try to endogenize the policy choice itself, by in turn modeling the policy and 
political process, the incentives of the different players (interest groups). In this setting, the 
consequences of introducing a policy might be very different, since over and above how 
individuals, households etc react to the policy is how the policy gets implemented, and 
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perhaps how other policies in turn get changed, or get influenced to be changed, by interest 
groups whose behavior we hope to have modeled sufficiently accurately. 
So far so good, or so controversial, because encapsulated in the above are the 
divisions that dog economic analysis of development policy, even when all sides agree on 
the objective of development policy (for example, reducing infant mortality rates, rather 
than building a sense of and a pride  in nationhood). Depending on assumptions of how 
markets behave, or how the political economy behaves, very different conclusions can be 
reached, for example, about the policy of reducing tariffs. If markets are competitive, and 
the political economy is impotent, then reducing tariffs turns out to improve the general 
welfare, suitably defined, despite some distributional consequences. But political economy 
is not of course impotent, otherwise the repeal of the Corn Laws in the 19th century Britain 
would not have been such a prolonged affair, and the Economist magazine would not have 
had to be founded to argue the case for it, and Trollope would not have had such great 
material for his novels. And markets are not necessarily perfectly competitive, or else 
Adam Smith would not have had to observe that "People of the same trade seldom meet 
together even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy 
against the public or some contrivance to raise prices." 
We economists know all this, of course. We get a bad rap from the other social 
scientists for ignoring distribution and politics. We certainly don’t ignore these things at the 
research frontier, but we often ignore it at the policy coal face. Paradoxically, therefore, 
where it matters most we tend to ignore politics in the policy prescription, although these 
days our research papers are replete with models of rational choice politics. 
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There are two other features of the models and the world view, which underpin our 
policy analysis, that are worth highlighting. We take “initial conditions” of natural 
resources, technology, etc as given for the policy analysis. And we take the behavioral 
responses of the different entities in our models not only as given but also to follow 
particular precepts and patterns. Rational choice—utility maximizing for individuals, profit 
maximizing for firms—is what drives our agents and hence our models. Again we are 
aware of this. We know that initial physical conditions matter—that is why economies rich 
in natural resources perform differently to those rich in unskilled labor (perhaps “poor in” 
might be a better description). In some sense the market structure—which markets are 
competitive, which are not--is also part of the initial conditions. 
So the outcome of a policy intervention depends on a lot of things. But how does it 
depend on history? Well, in a very straightforward sense today’s physical initial conditions 
are the result of history. Natural resource deposits are of course the product of prehistory. 
But this is perhaps not an interesting sense in which history matters. They are also the 
product of extraction in the past, which did depend on human behavior and thus begins to 
be an interesting sense in which history matters for development policy—human history 
altered the then initial conditions to give us the initial conditions of now, and since these 
initial conditions matter for the outcome of development policy, history matters for 
development policy. But does the simple time line of natural resource deposits, leading up 
to their current level, matter above and beyond what the current level is? Only if that time 
trend revealed something about the structure of the economy, how its entities would have 
had to have interacted to have led to that pattern and if that interaction were to continue, 
then history would be illuminating. But again, this is nothing new to economists. Torturing 
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historical time series data to reveal an underlying structure (or rather, to confess to a 
substructure within an assumed overall frame, the “maintained hypothesis”) is what 
econometricians do all the time. So what exactly is it that history gets us afresh? 
I would like to suggest that what it gets us is a handle on how the agents in the 
economy—individuals, households, firms, interest groups, etc--will respond to the policy 
intervention in question, taking as given the physical initial conditions (natural resources, 
technology, market structure, etc). But in order to allow the seed of this suggestion to take 
root it cannot be allowed to fall on the stony ground of conventional rational choice theory. 
Some people give up their lives for a cause. Others will suffer great hardship, undergo 
starvation, rather than eat food that is not acceptable to them culturally. Generally, human 
beings seem to be more than willing to cut off their noses to spite their faces or, to put it 
more generously, inflict great losses upon themselves and upon others to right what they 
consider to be an unjust outcome. They will leave money on the table if they perceive that 
picking it up would be unfair. There is considerable evidence of this in recorded human 
experience, from Homer and Herodotus, from Holinshed and Shakespeare, from 
Schicklgruber and Trevor-Roper. But, if it was needed, recent lab experiments with 
(mainly) American college students have begun to convince economists that there may be 
something in these deviations from rational choice theory after all. 
Once we economists accept this departure from rational choice theory, then the 
actual preferences and behavioral tendencies of individuals and groups within society 
become part of the initial conditions of our model, the model through which we are going 
to assess the proposed policy intervention. But how these initial conditions came to be is 
more interesting, or at least less mechanical, than physical initial conditions such as natural 
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resource availability, or even market structure. The same policy intervention, for example 
means testing of social benefits, elicits very different individual and social responses in 
different societies, for example Europe and America—and even within Europe there are 
variations. There is a visceral reaction to inflation in Germany which is very different from 
that elsewhere in Europe. And progressive taxation, and redistributive policies more 
generally, gets very different responses in different countries. 
These examples hint strongly that it is the history of the different societies that 
explains the difference. But this is just correlation? What is the causal mechanism? 
Scratching beneath the surface reveals that simple arguments will not suffice. Take the case 
of German inflation. For the immediate post war generation in Germany, hyperinflation 
was a living memory. It is understandable that they would be willing to incur significant 
costs in other dimensions to control inflation. For the generation that followed, the 
hyperinflation was their parents’ inflation, they had not themselves experienced it. But their 
concern is perhaps explainable by inculcation through parents. But what about the current 
generation, whose defining event was not the putting up of the Berlin wall, but its fall. 
Anti-inflation sentiment in Germany remains high, eighty years, four generations, after 
Weimar; sixty years after the Second World War; forty years after the Berlin wall went up; 
and now almost twenty years after it came down. The policy failures of four generations 
ago continue to animate attitudes to policy today, and underpin the stance of the 
Bundesbank and through it the stance of the European Central Bank.  
Clearly, history matters, and it matters in important and interesting ways for policy 
today. But it is not just actual events in the past. It is how they are recorded, interpreted, 
and the interpretation transmitted, that matters. This is what determines the mental makeup, 
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the preferences in economists’ terminology, of agents in the economy. That is the causal 
mechanism. It is the embedding of the past in the present’s perception of policy that is the 
transmission mechanism linking history to today’s development policy. That it is 
perception, and not reality (whatever that is or was), does not matter. For purposes of the 
analysis of development policy, how agents in the economy will react to it, perception is 
reality. If means testing is detested because in the past means test officers terrorized poor 
communities and heaped indignities upon them, and indeed this in turn was the outcome of 
a long history of a fear that poor relief would make poverty too easy2, and this has now 
become folk memory through a seamless combination of word of mouth, literature and, 
more recently, television, then that is the reality that policy will have to deal with. The 
balance may have to be shifted towards more Universalist approaches to benefit provision, 
with consequent loss in efficiency of resource use. But that is how it has to be—history 
matters. 
History matters also to how a ruling elite perceives its objectives and its constraints. 
The strong concern about inequality, especially spatial inequality, in China goes back to 
well before the communist era. It is rooted in the history of an empire with fissiparous 
tendencies, requiring force and suasion in equal measure to keep provinces from breaking 
away. It is that concern which is reflected in generations of Chinese rulers, right up to the 
present ruling elite of the Communist party. But, again, what is the transmission 
mechanism from the sensibilities acquired by the rules of the Qing Empire in the 18th 
century to the rulers of the Communist party today. It is not just, of course, the raw facts of 
what happened in the 18th century, the investment in flood control, famine relief, 
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orphanages and so on, but how these have been woven together through successive 
interpretations into a coherent narrative that has symbolic meaning to today’s rulers.3 And 
it is no less real for being symbolic. It affects today’s policy stance. History matters. 
It should be clear, then, that the way in which history matters is more than as a 
series of facts and events in the past related to the policy in question, say. Rather, what is 
equally if not more important is how and in what form these events of the past came to be 
embedded in the consciousness of the present generation. Indeed, as noted above, what is in 
the present consciousness may be quite far removed from the reality of the past, but it is the 
reality of the present, and thus influences the response to policy of individuals and groups 
of individuals. 
None of this is to suggest that history is destiny. Policy makers do not have to be 
the prisoners of the past, at least the past as it is embedded in the perceptions of the present 
generation. But they cannot ignore it either. At the very least they have to know what these 
perceptions are—this is just prudent description of the reality onto which the policy 
intervention will be implemented. But they must go further. If they are to overcome the 
weight of the past, they have to understand why the population and the polity have these 
perceptions about this or that policy. What was the process that led to their embedding—
what events in the past, what sort of interpretation, what transmission mechanism. It is only 
with this knowledge, knowledge that only the disciplined study of history in its various 
facets (political, social, intellectual, cultural) can provide, that they can address the 
constraints, or the opportunities, that history presents to them for the policy question at 
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hand. This is finally, in my view, the most important sense in which history matters for 
development policy. Listen up, economists! 
 8

